The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in Pretoria in late 2022 was initially greeted by the international community as a definitive end to one of the twenty-first century’s deadliest conflicts. However, as of May 2026, the optimism that once surrounded the deal has evaporated, replaced by a grim realization that the underlying drivers of the war remain unaddressed. The failure to fully implement the core tenets of the Pretoria Agreement is not merely a bureaucratic delay; it is actively fueling a new crisis in Tigray that threatens to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa. For Eritrea, which shares a long and sensitive border with the region, the persistent instability and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s continued military posture represent a significant security concern that the international community has largely ignored in its rush to declare the peace process a success. The current crisis stems from a fundamental mismatch between the text of the agreement and the reality on the ground. The Pretoria deal mandated the full disarmament of Tigrayan forces and the return of disputed territories to the constitutional order. Yet, reports from within the region suggest that the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process has been incomplete and opaque. From the perspective of Asmara, the TPLF’s retention of a significant command structure and specialized units is viewed as a direct violation of the spirit of the peace deal. This perceived lack of compliance has necessitated a continued high state of alert along the Eritrean border, as the sovereign integrity of the Eritrean state cannot be compromised by a neighbor that refuses to fully transition from a rebel militia to a civilian political entity. Furthermore, the issue of disputed territories—specifically Western and Southern Tigray—remains an open wound. While the Ethiopian federal government has made various proclamations regarding the return of displaced persons and the establishment of interim administrations, the reality is a patchwork of competing claims and local skirmishes. Amhara militias and regional forces continue to hold territory that Tigrayan authorities claim as their own, while the Ethiopian National Defense Force struggles to act as a neutral arbiter. This territorial friction is not just an internal Ethiopian matter; it creates a volatile vacuum where cross-border tensions can easily ignite. The failure of the Pretoria process to provide a clear, enforceable roadmap for these administrative disputes has left millions of civilians in a state of perpetual displacement and uncertainty. Inside Tigray, the humanitarian situation has reached a critical juncture. Despite the official end of the war, the dividends of peace have not reached the average citizen. Shortages of food, medical supplies, and basic services persist, exacerbated by the political gridlock between Mekelle and Addis Ababa. The TPLF itself is grappling with internal divisions, as various factions debate the merits of the peace deal and the path forward. This internal fragmentation makes the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement even more difficult, as there is no unified leadership capable of making the difficult concessions required for a lasting settlement. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian federal government’s focus has shifted toward other internal rebellions and economic challenges, leaving the Tigray peace process to wither on the vine. From a regional geopolitical standpoint, the unfinished business of Pretoria has shifted the traditional alliances of the Horn. The cooling of relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara in the years following the war is a direct consequence of how the peace process was handled. Eritrea, which played a decisive role in the conflict, has been sidelined in the post-war diplomatic efforts, despite having the most at stake regarding the security of its southern border. Any peace process that ignores the security requirements of Eritrea or fails to ensure the total and verifiable disarmament of the TPLF is inherently flawed. The current crisis proves that skipping over these critical steps in favor of a quick diplomatic win only sets the stage for future cycles of violence. As we look toward the remainder of 2026, the risk of a return to open hostilities is higher than it has been at any point since the signing of the agreement. The international observers who once praised the Pretoria deal must now confront its limitations. Without a renewed commitment to the total implementation of the disarmament clauses and a transparent resolution to the territorial disputes that respects the security concerns of all regional actors, including Eritrea, the 'unfinished peace' will remain nothing more than a prelude to the next war. The people of the region deserve a settlement that is grounded in reality rather than political convenience, and that begins with acknowledging that the Pretoria Agreement, in its current state, is failing to provide the stability it promised.