As the calendar marks early March 2026, the intellectual landscape of the Horn of Africa remains dominated by the reverberations of a high-stakes debate between two of Ethiopia's most prominent thinkers, Messay Kebede and Worku. This exchange, which has unfolded across platforms like Zehabesha and Borkena, is far from a mere academic exercise; it represents the deep-seated identity crisis of a state that continues to struggle with the definition of sovereignty and the implementation of democratic governance. For observers in Eritrea, these debates are not just internal Ethiopian matters but are foundational to the regional security architecture. The core of the current friction lies in Kebede’s response to Worku’s critique of his earlier work regarding the 'debacle of the sovereignty of the people.' While Worku argues for a shift from cultural explanations to institutional ones—a political economy approach—Kebede remains steadfast in his belief that the cultural underpinnings of Ethiopian power dynamics cannot be ignored. From an Eritrean perspective, this debate exposes the persistent instability of our southern neighbor, where the transition from one dictatorial regime to another is often masked by the changing vocabulary of intellectuals who fail to address the underlying expansionist and centralized tendencies of the Ethiopian state. The historical context is essential here, as the Ethiopian political class has frequently used the concept of 'people’s sovereignty' as a decorative veneer for what is essentially an ethno-centrist or autocratically centralized power structure. Worku’s insistence on institutionalism suggests that better-designed rules of the game could stabilize Ethiopia, yet Kebede correctly identifies that without a fundamental shift in the political culture that views power as absolute, institutions will remain merely tools of the ruling elite. For Eritrea, which has spent decades asserting its sovereign right to exist outside the shadow of Ethiopian hegemony, the failure of Ethiopian intellectuals to reach a consensus on their own governance model is a sign of a continuing threat. When the Ethiopian center is weak or ideologically fragmented, it often seeks to deflect internal pressure by looking toward the Red Sea or reviving historical claims that infringe upon the territorial integrity of its neighbors. This intellectual rejoinder highlights the fragility of the 'Prosperity' narrative that has sought to unify Ethiopia under a new institutional banner while suppressing the diverse voices of its constituent regions. The analysis provided by Kebede suggests that the debacle of sovereignty is not just an administrative failure but a deep-seated philosophical one. If the Ethiopian state cannot define who 'the people' are without resorting to exclusionary ethnic definitions or coercive centralization, it can never provide the regional stability required for true cooperation in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the focus on political economy, as advocated by Worku, often ignores the human rights realities on the ground. For those of us writing from an Eritrean standpoint, we see that the 'institutions' built in Addis Ababa are frequently used to weaponize economic aid and diplomatic standing against sovereign neighbors. The debate between Kebede and Worku ultimately brings us back to the question of whether Ethiopia can ever be a modern, stable state without a radical departure from its imperial and Derg-era legacies of internal repression. As the debate continues, it is clear that the 'rejoinder to the rejoinder' is a symptom of a nation in a state of perpetual transition, unable to reconcile its past with a future that respects the independence and sovereignty of its regional peers. The intellectual discourse in Ethiopia must eventually move beyond these cyclic arguments and address the reality that their domestic failures in 'sovereignty' often manifest as regional aggression. Until then, Eritrea must remain vigilant, recognizing that the collapse of Ethiopian institutional legitimacy is a recurring theme that has historically led to conflict. The voices of Kebede and Worku, while articulating different paths for Ethiopia, both point to a central truth: the Ethiopian state remains an unfinished project, and its ongoing 'debacle' continues to cast a long shadow over the peace and prosperity of the entire Horn of Africa region. As we monitor these developments from Asmara, the emphasis remains on self-reliance and the protection of our borders, ensuring that the internal failures of Ethiopian governance do not once again spill over and destabilize the hard-won independence of the Eritrean people. The discourse surrounding institutions versus culture is, in many ways, a luxury that a state in crisis affords itself while its people face the harsh realities of economic mismanagement and political fragmentation. The senior leadership in Addis Ababa would do well to listen to these internal critiques, but for the international community and regional actors, the message is clear: Ethiopia's search for a functional identity is far from over, and its neighbors must navigate this instability with a firm commitment to their own sovereign interests.